privilege to enjoy and use the land of another.
5
Moreover, it may be created only by a person
with title to or an estate in the servient estate.
6
Easements can be created in a number of ways
including easement by express grant, easement by prescription, and easement by implication of
law or necessity.
7
1. Easements by Express Grant
Express easements can be created by contract, deed or other written instrument.
8
To
create an express easement, the written instrument must describe with reasonable particularity
the land to which the easement extends.
9
It is not, however, necessary to delineate the exact path
and boundaries of the easement, i.e., provide a legal description of the easement.
10
The
description of an easement is sufficient if it provides a key so that the land where the easement is
located can be identified.
11
An easement description has been found sufficient in the following
situations:
• easement was described as being situated “between Lot #77, Lake George and
Pine Avenue, including causeway to the creek, near the railroad bridge, known
as the headwaters of the Gress River” was held to be sufficient.
12
5
5 Rest. of Law, §§ 450, p. 2901, 540b, p. 2903; Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952
(1961); Young v. Thendara, Inc.
, 328 Mich. 42, 43 N.W.2d 58 (1950); Kazi v. State Farm Fire
and Cas. Co., 24 Cal. 4
th
871, 15 P.3d 223 (2001); Preseault v. U.S., 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes
, 138 Idaho 543, 66 P.3d 798 (2003).
6
25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements and Licenses § 15.
7
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1; Jones v. Mauldin, 208 Ga. 14, 64 S.E.2d 452 (Ga., 1951) overruled on
other grounds.
8
Latham Homes Sanitation, Inc. v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 245 Ga.App. 573, 538 S.E.2d 107
(2000); Bibb County v. Georgia Power Co.
, 241 Ga.App. 131, 525 S.E.2d 136 (1999); Khamis
Enterprises, Inc. v. Boone, 480 S.E.2d 364 (1997); Irvin v. Laxmi, 266 Ga. 204, 467 S.E.2d 510
(1996); City of Columbia, Mo. v. Baurichter
, 729 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Lewis v.
DeKalb County, 251 Ga. 100, 303 S.E.2d 112 (1983); Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 Ga.
608, 1 S.E.2d 579 (1939); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Greenfield
, 128 S.E. 430 (1925);
Chapman v. Gordon
, 29 Ga. 250 (1859).
9
Lovell v. Anderson, 242 Ga.App. 537, 530 S.E.2d 233 (2000); Concerned Citizens v. State Ex.
rel. Rhodes, 329 N.C. 37, 404 S.E.2d 677 (1991); Champion v. Neason, 220 Ga. 15, 136 S.E.2d
718 (1964); Lewis v. Bowen
, 209 Ga. 717 (1), 75 S.E.2d 422 (1953); Rest. of Law, § 471(d), p.
2964.
10
Wynns v. White, 273 Ga.App. 209, 614 S.E.2d 830 (2005); Murdock v. Ward, 267 Ga. 303,
477 S.E.2d 835 (1996).
11
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1; Howard v. Rivers, 266 Ga. 185, 465 S.E.2d 666 (1996); Glass v. Carnes,
260 Ga. 627(4), 398 S.E.2d 7 (1990); Champion v. Neason
, 220 Ga. 15, 136 S.E.2d 718 (1964).
12
Wynns v. White, 273 Ga.App. 209, 614 S.E.2d 830 (2005); Adams v. City of Ila, 221 Ga.App.
372, 471 S.E.2d 310 (1996)(property description was sufficient in deed granting right-of-way;
deed contained sufficient “keys” to clarify any indefiniteness in property description, making
reference to militia district in which right-of-way was located, and defining right-of-way
specifically by referring to and incorporating street’s preexisting roadway).
33